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Abstract
The main objective of this paper is to analyse consumer response and welfare
effects due to changes in energy or environmental policy. To achieve this ob-
jective we formulate and estimate an econometric model for non-durable con-
sumer demand in Sweden that utilises micro- and macro-data. In the demand
model male and female labour supply is included as conditioning goods. To ac-
count for possible changes in labour supply due to increasing carbon taxes we
estimate separate labour supply functions for men and women. In the simula-
tions we consider two revenue neutral scenarios that both imply a doubling of
the CO2 tax; one that returns the revenues in the form of a lower VAT and one
that subsidise public transport. One conclusion from the simulations is that the
CO2 tax has regional distribution effects, in the sense that household living in
sparsely populated areas carry a larger share of the tax burden.
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1. Introduction
The main objective of this paper is to analyse consumer response due to changes in energy or
environmental policy. More specifically the objective involves simulations of various non-
marginal tax changes.
1 Since the focus in this paper is on energy and environmental policy,
most of the attention will be devoted to the demand for various energy goods, and/or groups
of goods that are relatively energy intensive. The basic motivation for the empirical issues
raised in this paper can be found in the development of Swedish energy and environmental
policy and the emerging interest in using environmental taxes in Sweden and other countries.
 The empirical issue raised in this paper is also important considering the outcome from
the climate convention held in Kyoto 1997. According to the Kyoto protocol the overall emis-
sions of greenhouse gases from the developed countries should be at least 5% below 1990
levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012. The commitment for the European Union is an
8% reduction for the same period. If all the countries within the EU ratify the protocol the
burden share for Sweden will be a 4% increase, compared with the 1990 level.
2  Thus this
paper could be viewed as one input in the evaluation of the costs and distributional impacts of
Swedish compliance with the Kyoto protocol.
Energy policy in Sweden became particularly active in conjunction with the oil crisis in
the early seventies. In the 1970s Swedish energy policy was focused on problems related to
the fear of an oil shortage. In the 1980s the motivation for policy intervention switched from
shortage concerns to environmental concerns. This switch was emphasised with the appoint-
ment of the Commission of Environmental Charges in 1988 (SOU 1990:59), whose best-
known suggestion was a tax on CO2 emissions. The CO2 tax, introduced in 1991, was initially
set at the level of 250 SEK/ton (30 USD/ton) of CO2 released, and it was levied on all fossil
fuels. As of January 1, 1997 the tax has risen to 390 SEK/ton (46 USD/ton) of emitted CO2.
3
A further "greening" of the Swedish tax system has been on the policy agenda ever since.
However, the focus has switched somewhat towards the interaction between environmental
taxation and public finance, the so-called “double-dividend” issue.
4 One of the few areas of
consensus reached in this public debate is that, apart from environmental considerations, the
                                                
1 Examples of similar simulations can be found in Baker, McKay & Symons (1990), Nichèle
& Robin (1995), and Hansson-Brusewitz (1997).
2 The burden share within EU is the result of negotiations within EU. The allowance of an
increase in Swedish emissions can be explained by the fact that 1990 was an unusually warm
year, which led to unusually low emission levels, and the fact that Sweden already has rela-
tively low emissions per capita.
3 A number of other policy measures were proposed and undertaken, see for example,
Brännlund & Kriström (1999) and Brännlund & Gren (1999).
4 For a discussion of the double dividend issue, see Oates (1995), Bovenberg & Goulder
(1996), and Starret (1999).2
size, structure and stability of the relevant tax bases are important parameters to consider in
environmental policy.
To achieve the main objective of this paper we formulate and estimate an econometric
model for non-durable consumer demand in Sweden that utilises micro- and macro-data.
5 The
system of demand equations is derived assuming cost-minimising households. The basic
model employed here is essentially a two-stage budgeting model, which combines micro-data
from the Swedish Household Expenditure Surveys with aggregate data from the Swedish Na-
tional Accounts. In the first stage it is assumed that the household determines how much to
spend on non-durable goods and how much to spend on durable goods (including savings). In
the second stage it is assumed that the household allocates its total expenditure for non-
durable goods on each non-durable commodity.
The present study contributes to the existing literature by simultaneously relaxing assump-
tions that in previous studies are only partly relaxed. The assumptions considered here are,
separability between the labour-leisure choice and the goods consumption choice, linear in-
come effects, and the assumption concerning purchasing behaviour. In this study labour sup-
ply is included in the model and we can explicitly test for separability between labour supply
and demand for non-durable goods. Non-linear income effects are allowed and tested for by
adding non-linear expenditure terms into the system of demand equations, and to cope with
the zero expenditure problem Heckman’s (1979) two-step approach is used.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The modelling framework is outlined in the
next section, and econometric considerations are presented in Section 3. Results from the
econometric model are presented in Section 4, and result from the simulations in Section 5.
The paper ends with some concluding remarks in Section 6.
2. The Modelling Framework
To model the demand for petrol, public transport, other transports (including air, railway and
taxi transport), residential heating (including electricity, oil-heating and district heating), and
other non-durables we will use microeconomic data from three cross-section studies and ag-
gregate time-series data from the national accounts. We begin by considering an appropriate
framework for the demand model at the microeconomic level.
Most empirical studies of household demand and consumption assume that preferences
over goods are separable from labour supply. However, casual observations suggest that this
may be a poor assumption. Obvious examples are the costs of going to work, such as travel
and child care costs. If hours of work affect preferences between individual goods then de-
                                                
5 Examples of studies where both micro- and macro-data are utilised are Imbens & Lancaster
(1994) and Jorgenson & Stoker (1997).3
mand systems that take no account of this dependence may give biased estimates. To include
labour supply in the demand system we will employ a conditional approach (Browning &
Meghir 1991). That is, instead of estimating complete labour supply functions we include the
hours of work for the husband and wife in the model as conditioning goods.
One advantage with the conditional approach is that we do not need to model the determi-
nants of labour supply explicitly. This contrasts sharply with the unconditional approach
(Blundell & Walker 1982), where joint commodity demand and labour supply systems are
estimated. Another advantage with the conditional approach is that if a good is given in pre-
determined quantities, i.e., rationed, then it is appropriate to put the level of the rationed good
on the right-hand side (Pollak 1969 and Deaton 1981). This provides a methodological ad-
vantage since we do not have to deal with issues of (involuntary) unemployment explicitly,
i.e., individuals with zero hours of work.
Consumer demand patterns typically found in micro-data sets vary considerably across
households with different household characteristics and with different levels of income. As
indicated in Banks, Blundell & Lewbel (1997) some goods are non-linear in expenditure while
some are linear. Furthermore, the welfare effects of an indirect tax reform is biased when a
non-linear expenditure pattern is approximated with a demand system linear in total expendi-
ture (Banks et al. 1997). A flexible functional form of consumer preferences, which can han-
dle non-linear expenditure effects and still be exactly aggregated is the quadratic extension
(Banks et al. 1997) to Deaton & Muellbauer’s (1980) almost ideal model (AIDS).
We therefore take the quadratic AIDS (QAIDS) model as our basic specification and
model the differences in consumption patterns between different household categories, by
adding intercept and slope parameters in the budget share equations of the demand system.
The preferences are characterised in such a way that, in each period t, household k makes de-
cisions on how much to consume of the above specified commodities conditional on various
household characteristics, d, and labour-market decisions, i.e., female and male hours of work
hf and hm. To the intercept term  i 0 α  we also include a set of variables T that are purely deter-
ministic time-dependent variables, like seasonal dummies and a time trend. Household k’s
budget share for good i, sit
k , then takes the form:
()
() []
() () [] () , ) , , ( / ln ) ( / ) (
) , , ( / ln ) (





d h p a x p b h h
d h p a x h h

































× + + +
× + + +
+ + + = ∑
δ δ δ
β β β
γ α α α
d      
d      
T d
i = 1,…,n,( 1 )
where  jt p  is the price of good j,  xt
k  is household k’s total expenditure on the i =1,…,n goods
and ) ( ln ⋅
k
t a  and  ) ( ln ⋅
k
t b  are defined by4
( ) ∑∑ ∑ + + + =
jl









t p p p h h h p a ln ln
2
1
ln ) ( ) , , ( ln 2 1 0 γ α α α d d (2)
. ln ) ) ( ( ) , , ( ln
1













t p h h h p b β β β d d (3)
Since we only have access to three comparable cross-section surveys of household expen-
ditures, we will combine the estimators from the micro-model with estimators from a QAIDS
model estimated on aggregate data to get more precise estimates of the parameters.
3. Econometric Considerations
To estimate the microeconomic model we have used pooled cross-section data from the
Swedish Family Expenditure Survey (FES) 1985, 1988 and 1992, comprising in all about 12
000 observations.  From Table A1 in Appendix, we see that there are some differences in the
consumption pattern of households in different regions. For households in the northern areas,
the average petrol share is twice as large as for households in Stockholm. On the other hand
the average budget share for public transport is about three times as large in Stockholm com-
pared to thinly populated areas. Table A1 also indicate that households in the northern areas
on average have a larger budget share for energy than households in the southern areas.
In the FES, households are asked to record their expenditures on non-durables such as
food, clothing and public transport during a four-week period. For some commodities such as
petrol and heating the households report their annual expenditure. This implies that we can
only impose three price observations for petrol and heating. For the commodities that were
purchased during the four-week accounting period, we impose price variables from quarterly
observations from the national accounts corresponding to the accounting period. To overcome
the problem of insufficient time variation in the micro-data we also use quarterly expenditure
and price data from the national accounts, 1980:I to 1997:IV, to estimate the macroeconomic
model.
The second issue we consider is the occurrence of zero expenditure in the diary recording.
For public transport and other transport the occurrence of zero expenditure is as high as 49
and 76%, respectively. The model that has traditionally been used to account for censoring in
commodity demand is the Tobit model (Tobin 1958 and Amemiya 1974). However, the un-
derlying assumption in such models
6 is that the same stochastic process determines both the
value of continuous observations of the dependent variable and the discrete switch at zero.
That is, a zero realisation for the dependent variable represents a corner solution. This clearly
restricts other possible determinants of the zero observations, such as infrequency of purchase
                                                
6 i.e., the Tobit1 model, Amemiya (1984).5
or misreporting in commodity demand. Such restrictions have been recognised in the past by,
for example, Deaton & Irish (1984) and Blundell & Meghir (1987).
Infrequency of purchase is probably the most likely reason for zero expenditure on public
and other transport. To allow for infrequency of purchase, Blundell & Meghir (1987) pre-
sented a bivariate alternative to the Tobit model with separate processes determining the cen-
soring rule and the continuous observations. It is also reasonable to assume that there are
separate processes determining the zero-one decision of having a car or not and the decision
concerning how many kilometres to drive. One can also argue that all households have some
consumption of heating, so zero expenditure on heating cannot possibly correspond to a cor-
ner solution. Therefore, to get consistent parameter estimates we follow Heckman’s (1979)
two-step procedure and estimate separate probit and truncated regression models for each
commodity group.
As pointed out by Lewbel (1996), measurement errors in the dependent variables, i.e. the
expenditure on individual goods, will complicate things further since they will contribute to
errors in total expenditure. Lewbel (1996) provides a simple technique to enable consistent
estimation. The technique consists of multiplying the share equation model (1) by different
powers of the total expenditure and then estimating the resulting system by two stage least
squares or generalised method of moments (GMM) techniques. Consistent estimators of the
original demand system parameters are then obtained by transformations of the two stage least
squares or GMM estimators.
Therefore, we estimate the quadratic almost ideal demand system in expenditure form. To
simplify the simulations, we follow Blundell, Pashardes and Weber (1993) and use household
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7 For the demand equation (1), suppressing the household specific parameters, this simplifica-
tion implies that sit = αi + Σj ln pjt + βi(ln xt + ω(ln xt)
2), where ω  is some constant, requiring
that δi = βiω, that is, the ratio of the coefficients on expenditures and squared terms in expen-
ditures must be the same for all commodities (see Banks et al. 1997 and Blundell et al. 1993).
This restriction has not been imposed on the estimated demand system.6
) (⋅ Φ  are the probability density and cumulative distribution functions of the standard normal
distribution, with  i ψ ˆ  estimated in a first step from a univariate probit model for good i (see
i.e., Leung and Yu 1996). The explanatory variables included in  t z are the number of children
0-2, 3-6, and 7-17 years old, number of children over 18 years with and without employment,
number of adults, locational variables, male and female working hours, the prices of the
commodities in the demand system, the log of total expenditures, seasonal dummy variables
and a time trend, all multiplied with total expenditures 
k
t x  as in (4).
The expenditure system has a set of within-equation and cross-equation restrictions that
we wish to impose. These are homogeneity, which gives rise only to within-equation restric-
tions, and symmetry, which gives rise to cross-equation restrictions. Homogeneity can thus be
imposed in a first stage by estimating single equations, whereas cross-equation restrictions can
be imposed in a second stage, using a minimum distance estimator (see Ferguson 1958). Let µ
be a  1 × q  vector of unrestricted parameters, and let θ be a vector of symmetry-restricted pa-
rameters of dimension  1 × p . Then under the null θ = g(µ), where g is a known function and p
≤ q, the symmetry restricted parameter estimates can be obtained by minimising
[] [] θ µ θ µ θ µ − Σ ′ − = Ψ
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where  µ ˆ  is the vector of unrestricted estimates and  µ Σ ˆ  is an estimate of the covariance ma-
trix of  µ ˆ . The minimised value of  ) (θ Ψ  follows a chi-square distribution with degrees of
freedom equal to the number of restrictions. The consistency of the minimum distance esti-
mator simply requires that the restrictions are correct and that µ ˆ  is a consistent estimator. For
the linear case the restrictions simplify to θ = Kµ, where K is a q×p matrix. To deal with the
possibility of endogeneity of total expenditures and hours of work we estimate each equation
with GMM in TSP 4.3, and instead of specifying a particular form of the heteroscedasticity we
employ White’s (1980) approach to calculate the standard errors.
Blundell et al. (1993) show that exact aggregation over households of the quadratic almost
ideal demand system yields a macro-model with similar structure, provided that distributional
statistics like the Theil entropy index are included in the model. National accounts do not usu-
ally contain this information, necessary for the macro-model to be a consistent estimator of
the parameters of the micro-model. However, in order to be as close as possible to the ideal
case, we will add trend and dummy variables, if appropriate, to capture changes in consumer
preferences.
Following Nichèle & Robin (1995), we use the same type of minimum distance estimator























































where  m θ ˆ and  M θ ˆ  are vectors of stacked homogeneity and symmetry constrained parameters
from the micro- and macro-model, whereas  m Σ ˆ  and  M Σ ˆ  are their corresponding estimated
covariance matrices. An estimate of the covariance matrix  m Σ ˆ  of the homogeneity and sym-
metry restricted microeconomic estimator is 
1 1 ' ) ˆ ( − − Σ K K µ . Given the large variation in the ex-
penditure level in the FES and the possibility of aggregation bias in the macro-data that might
affect the expenditure parameters (Blundell et al. 1993), we only combine the price parameters
from the micro- and macro-models.
4. Estimation results
In this section we present some of the estimation results from the micro- and macroeconomic
models. We started the analysis for the microeconomic model by testing the functional form
for each expenditure equation, i.e., whether the non-linear expenditure term should enter the
model or not. The household characteristics we included in the model were the number of
children 0-2, 3-6, and 7-17 years old, number of children over 18 years with and without em-
ployment, number of adults, age of the head of the household, and locational variables.
Likelihood ratio (LR) tests indicated that we could reject linearity for all equations, except
for the public transport equation with a p-value of 0.14. The p-values of the LR-test for petrol,
other transport, heating and other goods were all 0.00. The imposed restrictions for homoge-
neity were found to be valid for all equations except for other goods, at a 10% significance
level. Symmetry was, however, rejected.
To test for collinearity between the regressors in (4) and the inverse Mill’s ratio, we used
the adjusted R-squared of the auxiliary regression (regressing  i λ ˆ  against the explanatory vari-
ables in (4)). The adjusted R-squared for the four regressions lay in the interval 0.03 to 0.002,
which indicate that there are no collinearity problems. One reason for the low correlation is
the large range of the explanatory variables in the probit model. For example, if we just in-
clude a constant, seasonal dummy variables, and locational dummy variables in the probit
model, the adjusted R-squared from regressing λ ˆ from the petrol probit model against the
explanatory variables in (4) was 0.18.
If there are no collinearity problems, Leung and Yu (1996) show that the t-tests on the co-
efficients of  i λ ˆ  are very effective. And from Table 2A in Appendix we see that the t-values on
i ϕ  in the petrol, other transport and heating equation are 1.93, 4.57 and –2.64 respectively,
indicating that it is appropriate to include the inverse Mill’s ratio in the regression to have
consistent parameter estimates. However, the t-value 1.39 on  i ϕ  in the public transport equa-
tion is not significant at any reasonable significance level.
Before we estimated the model on aggregate time series data we pre-tested the series for
seasonal unit roots with Hylleberg, Engle, Granger & Yoo’s (1990) seasonal unit root test.
The test indicated that both the expenditure and price series has a unit root at the zero fre-8
quency, i.e., they are integrated of order one. For some of the expenditure series the test indi-
cated roots at some of the seasonal frequencies as well. We have therefore applied the sea-
sonal filter  ), 1 (
3 2 B B B + + +  where B is the back shift operator, i.e.,  , p t t
p x x B − =  to all
series in order to filter out any seasonal unit roots and obtain series that are integrated of order
I(1,0). In the estimated model no unit roots were found in the residuals. The imposed restric-
tions of homogeneity and symmetry were rejected, with a LR-test of homogeneity  9 . 67
2
4 = χ .
The model on aggregate data has been estimated with GMM allowing for moving average
components.
The parameter estimates
8 in Appendix Table A2 indicate that labour supply has a signifi-
cant effect on the expenditures on petrol, with an opposite sign for male and female hours of
work. For expenditures on public transport and other transport, the individual parameter esti-
mates on labour supply have no significant effect. However, the LR-tests for weak separability
between goods and labour supply in Table 1 indicate that neither male nor female labour sup-
ply is separable from commodity demand. The only exception for male labour supply is in
other transport and for female labour supply in public transport and heating.
Table 1: Separability tests.
Equation Male hours Female hours Total hours
Petrol ) 01 . 0 ( 8 . 12    ) 08 . 0 ( 8 . 6    ) 00 . 0 ( 8 . 22   
Public transport ) 07 . 0 ( 4 . 5    ) 11 . 0 ( 4 . 4    ) 05 . 0 ( 4 . 9   
Other transport ) 61 . 0 ( 8 . 1    ) 01 . 0 ( 8 . 10    ) 04 . 0 ( 4 . 13   
Heating ) 00 . 0 ( 0 . 28    ) 26 . 0 ( 0 . 4    ) 00 . 0 ( 0 . 32   
Other goods ) 00 . 0 ( 0 . 74    ) 05 . 0 ( 0 . 8    ) 00 . 0 ( 0 . 80   
           Not: Likelihood ratio tests with p-values within parentheses.
From the macroeconomic model, based on per capita consumption, in Appendix Table A3
we see that the expenditure coefficients are significant, with negative parameter estimates for
the quadratic expenditure in the petrol and heating equation. The estimated price coefficients
are generally significant at a 5% significance level and rather small in absolute value. The
combined price parameters from the micro and macroeconomic model are presented in Table
A4. From the table we see that the point estimates are close to the estimates obtained from the
                                                
8 In an initial estimation of the demand system we used the real income level, I
k, to instrument
for total expenditure. However, the estimated parameters with real income as instrument dif-
fered a great deal from the parameter estimates obtained when we use total expenditure as an
instrument for itself. This result is probably due to a weak correlation between the instruments






k, i.e. the instrumental setting in the initial estimation, we obtained a
R
2 measure of 0.30. Due to the lack of good instruments, the FES also lacks good instruments
for hours of work, we have used the variables in the demand system as instruments for them-
selves.9
macroeconomic model. An exception is the own price coefficient in the heating equation that
becomes negatively significant, due to the strongly significant negative parameter estimate in
the microeconomic model.
     Although the individual parameter values can be of interest, the economic information of
marginal changes in expenditure and prices is most easily summarised in terms of elasticities.
From the budget elasticities reported in Table 2 we can see that there are large differences
between different household categories. For households without children the demand for pet-
rol will increase more than for households with children, due to a marginal increase in expen-
diture. It is also apparent that the budget elasticity for petrol and public transport is larger for
households with lower disposable income. For petrol there is no large difference in expendi-
ture elasticities between the regions. For public transport and heating there are some differ-
ences between the regions. The expenditure elasticity for households living in the three largest
cities in Sweden, i.e. Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö, is higher, compared to the elasticity
for households in other regions. However, for all household categories, petrol, public transport
and heating are considered as necessities. The highest budget elasticities are found for other
transport. It should, however, be pointed out that some of these estimates have large standard
errors.













Lowest 0.75 (0.32) 0.65 (0.16) 3.96 (2.31) -0.05 (0.36) 1.01 (0.04)
Next lowest 0.73 (0.23) 0.63 (0.11) 3.11 (1.42) 0.09 (0.33) 1.02 (0.03)
Middle 0.65 (0.18) 0.55 (0.19) 2.89 (1.55) 0.15 (0.28) 1.04 (0.03)
Next highest 0.57 (0.20) 0.43 (0.26) 3.14 (2.73) 0.22 (0.23) 1.05 (0.02)
Highest 0.52 (0.23) 0.44 (0.71) 2.43 (3.31) 0.26 (0.32) 1.05 (0.02)
Number of children below 18 years
No children 0.69 (0.21) 0.56 (0.23) 2.68 (1.98) 0.17 (0.31) 1.04 (0.03)
One 0.59 (0.21) 0.43 (0.21) 2.21 (2.41) 0.24 (0.34) 1.04 (0.03)
Two or more 0.49 (0.22) 0.45 (0.71) 3.57 (3.46) 0.25 (0.25) 1.05 (0.03)
Region
Stockholm 0.60 (0.40) 0.52 (0.17) 2.72 (4.67) 0.27 (0.35) 1.02 (0.03)
Gothen-
burg/Malmö
0.52 (0.21) 0.57 (0.16) 3.01 (1.98) 0.29 (0.37) 1.03 (0.02)
Major towns 0.64 (0.19) 0.54 (0.71) 2.80 (1.60) 0.15 (0.23) 1.04 (0.02)
Southern areas 0.57 (0.14) 0.40 (0.30) 3.27 (2.06) 0.15 (0.31) 1.05 (0.02)
Major towns
northern areas
0.59 (0.20) 0.17 (0.40) 2.51 (2.40) 0.14 (0.17) 1.05 (0.04)
Northern areas 0.60 (0.24) 0.36 (0.31) 3.59 (2.84) 0.14 (0.46) 1.04 (0.04)
Note: Standard deviations within parentheses.10
      The calculated uncompensated price elasticities reveal small differences between different
household categories. The magnitude of the price elasticity is around -1 for petrol, public
transport, and other goods,  –1.3 for other transports, and –0.6 for heating. Details concerning
all compensated and uncompensated price elasticities are available from the authors on re-
quest.
5. Simulations
The empirical model from the previous section is used to illustrate response and impact on
different households due to non-marginal changes of the carbon dioxide (CO2) tax. The type
of model used here is specifically useful in such an analysis. First of all, the CO2 tax is essen-
tially a tax on fossil fuels, which means that it hits not only one specific consumer good, but
also all other goods containing fossil fuels. In this particular case a CO2 tax change will obvi-
ously affect the consumer price on petrol. But fossil fuels are also used as a primary energy
source for heating purposes, both as input in district heating plants and directly by individual
households. Thus, it should be apparent that a consistent system of demand equations is called
for since it takes into account own-price effects as well as cross-price effects. Secondly, a non-
marginal tax change, which has a significant effect on prices, will affect the households' real
income. A demand system of the type used here takes this income effect into account. In ad-
dition, the model employed includes non-linear income effects, which may be important when
large tax changes are considered, and if effects from scenarios with economic growth are to be
analysed.
Since the conditioning approach on labour supply does not account for labour supply re-
sponse due to changes in prices and real income, we have estimated separate labour supply
functions for male and females to account for these effects. Due to data limitations in the FES,
which only includes information on the household’s total labour income, we have estimated
labour supply functions for households with one adult. To make comparisons with other
studies on labour supply possible we have restricted our sample to prime aged persons, 25 to
55 years old. In the estimation we have applied a common and simple functional form of the
labour supply function. The equation for weekly hours of work, h, is specified as
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where  t w  is the post tax hourly wage rate,  t m  is non-labour income, 
k
t P  is Stones price index
and u is a vector of household characteristics plus a constant term. To this standard labour
supply function the price variables in the demand system are added. Following Blomqvist
(1996) we linearize the budget constraint and use instrumental variables techniques to esti-
mate the labour supply functions. We let the gross wage rate and non-labour income be ex-11
ogenous. As instruments for the net wage rate we use the gross wage rate, nonlabour income
and the household characteristics included in the vector u, see Table A5 in Appendix. In the
considered sample all individuals were working.
The results from the labour supply estimation are presented in Table A5 in appendix. The
table reveals that price increases for petrol, public transport and other transport have a nega-
tive effect on labour supply, whereas price increases on heating and other goods increases
labour supply. None of these effects are significant however. The wage elasticity for single
men and women is estimated to –0.01 and –0.03 respectively.
9
The basic motivation for the simulations is the Swedish commitment according to the
Kyoto-protocol. As pointed out in the introductory section of the paper, a number of studies
have attempted to assess the macroeconomic (Harrison & Kriström, 1999) as well as micro-
economic (Hansson-Brusewitz, 1997) impacts on the Swedish economy of various policies to
reduce green house gas emissions. The scenarios we consider in this study are to some extent
designed to make a rough comparison with these studies possible. The first scenario (C100)
includes a 100% increase of the CO2 tax, with a tax replacement in the form of a lower gen-
eral VAT. The second scenario (C100PT) includes a 100% increase of the CO2 tax, but with a
tax replacement in the form of lower VAT on public transport. Thus both second scenarios are
revenue neutral and have both been considered as options in a green tax reform.
5.1 Simulation method
The simulation method can be described as follows. The percentage price change on good i is
calculated according to the following formula:
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
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where the superscript denotes tax regime (0 is baseline tax), t is the VAT rate for good i, and τ
is the excise duty on good i. It should be noted that τ shows the excise duties share of the pro-
ducer price (price exclusive of taxes), and that it includes all energy related indirect taxes.
Furthermore, it is assumed that all households face the same prices. The price level for good i
after the tax change is then equal to:
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9 Based on a meta-analysis Wikström (1999) estimate the median wage elasticity for married
men and women in Sweden to 0.08 and 0.3 respectively.12
which means that the after-tax change Stone price index for household k (or expenditure de-
flator) equals:
1 1 ln ln i i
k
i
k p s P ∑ = ,( 9 )
where, as previously, 
k
i s  is household k's initial expenditure share on good i. It should be
noted that we do not allow for possible general equilibrium effects. That is, we assume that
taxes are shifted completely on consumer prices. For at least energy goods, such as petrol, this
may not be an unreasonable assumption since these goods are traded on international com-
petitive markets.
Substituting expression (8) and (9) into the demand system for household k then gives us
the new consumption vector according to:
( )
() , ˆ ] / ln[ ~ ˆ
] / ln[ ~ ˆ ln ˆ ~ ˆ
0 0 2 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1
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where a ^ denotes an estimate and  k d
~
 is the vector of household characteristics, including
labour supply. The superscript 0 indicates the point of reference. In both scenarios we keep all
characteristics (such as number of children) as well as nominal expenditure (x) unchanged.
The last term in equation (10), 
0 ˆk ε , represents unexplained household-specific effects not
accounted for in the estimations, and the effect of infrequent purchase. The latter are assumed
to remain constant over simulations.
10
Each household’s tax payment on good i, before (m = 0) and after (m = 1) the tax change,
is calculated as:
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where VAT denotes value added tax payment, and T indirect taxes, or excise duties, on energy
goods.
To evaluate the welfare effects from the tax reform we use compensated variation,
) , ( ) , (
0 0 0 1 v e v e CV p p − = , i.e., the amount of money the household needs to be given at the
new set of prices in order to attain the pre-reform level of utility  0 v . The CV is calculated as
                                                
10 The last term can be omitted if we just want to analyse relative (percentage) changes. If we
want to compare consumption or tax levels after the tax with the levels at the reference point,
this term should be included.13
a second order Taylor expansion for each household as:
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where  c x is a vector of Hicksian demand functions and  ij p c S p x = ∂ ∂ 0 | ) / ( is a matrix of com-
pensated own- and cross-price effects.
5.2 Simulation results
Baseline taxes
We use the tax rates valid for 1998 as a baseline tax system. Since the last year in the micro
data set is 1992, we have multiplied all expenditures by the growth rate in private consump-
tion from 1992 to 1998, and the resulting consumption pattern will therefore serve as the ref-
erence point (0). The baseline taxes are displayed in Table 3, where τ
0
CO2 shows the CO2 share
of the producer price. The first column displays the baseline VAT rate. Here it can be noticed
that the VAT on public and other transports are 12% (levied on producer price plus excise
duty). The second column displays the baseline excise duty, as the share of the producer price,
and column three the corresponding CO2 tax. The number 2.23 for petrol in the second col-
umn means then that the excise duty on petrol (energy plus CO2 tax) in 1998 amounted to
3.61 SEK/litre (0.42 USD). The corresponding number in column three, 0.43, implies a CO2
tax of 0.86 SEK/litre (0.10 USD).
Results C100
In Table 3 it can be seen that C100 implies an increase of the implicit tax rate, τ, on petrol
from 2.23 to 2.65, which corresponds to a 13% petrol price increase. Furthermore the reform
implies that the general VAT level can be reduced by only 2%, from 25% to 24.5%. The latter
illustrates the problem with replacing a broad-based tax with a narrow based tax. The reform
implies a 32% consumer price increase on oil, while the price on electricity decreases with
0.4% due to the lower VAT. There is no CO2 tax on electricity in Sweden. The tax change
have a more pronounced effect on the consumer price for oil than for petrol due to the fact that
the baseline tax on oil is lower than on petrol. Furthermore, the price change on district heat-
ing is rather moderate (3%) due to the fact that only 20% of primary energy inputs consist of
energy goods that are subject to excise duties. It should also be noted that the average effect14
on the overall “consumer price index” (StoneP) is small, approximately 0.6%. The reason is
that the average budget shares for the various energy goods are small.
According to the labour supply function in Section 5 these price changes would result in
lower labour supply for both men and women with approximately 3%.  For men there is a
decrease from 40.8 hours per week to 39.8, and for women there is a reduction from 35.8
hours per week to 34.6. Since the price coefficients in the labour supply function are not sig-
nificant and the fact that it was only possible to estimate labour supply functions for a small
part of the individuals in the sample, we have not considered the labour supply changes in the
simulations.







Petrol 0.25 2.23 0.43 2.65 13
Electricity 0.25 0.31 0.31   -0.4
Heating oil 0.25 1.24 0.73 1.96 32
Public transport 0.12 0.20
a 0.06
a 0.26   5
Other transport 0.12 0.30
a 0.10
a 0.40   8
District heating 0.25 0.16
b 0.07
b 0.23   3
Heating   3 (7.00)
c
StoneP  0.6 (0.009)
c
Notes: 
a Due to missing data these numbers are "best guesses". 
b  In 1998 ap-
proximately 10% of primary energy input in district heating consists of oil and
10% of electricity. Accordingly we have that τ
0 = 0.1⋅ 1.24+0.1⋅ 0.31. Other pri-
mary energy inputs such as biofuels are untaxed. 
c Standard deviation within pa-
rentheses.
Table 4 displays the effect from C100. The numbers in columns 1 to 4 display the change
in real consumption (quantity) due to the tax increase. Table 4 reveals a reduction of petrol
demand by approximately 11% for all household categories. For public transport the average
decrease in demand is about 5%, without any clear pattern between the different income
groups. For other transport the results indicate that households with the lowest income make
the smallest adjustment.
When it comes to the number of children below 18, the simulation results indicate no dif-
ferences between the households for petrol. For public transport, households with two or more
children adjust more to the higher price than households with no or one child. Other transport
shows the same pattern as public transport, with larger demand changes for households with
children. According to the results the demand for heating is altered most for households with-
out children. The simulation also indicates that the adjustment in real demand for heating de-
creases as the number of children increases.15
Concerning household location the results in Table 4 reveal that the effects on petrol de-
mand are similar in all regions. This is also an anticipated result considering the estimation
results, although the conventional wisdom is that households in the northern part of Sweden
are less sensitive to price changes. According to the simulation, households in the northern
areas will adjust their real demand for public transport less than households in other regions
will. For other transport the adjustment is smallest for the households living in the three big
cities (Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö). Concerning heating the results indicate that real
heating consumption will decrease less for households in the three big cities and major towns
compared to households in the other regions.













   ∆(T+VAT)
(SEK)
∆Τ% CV




Lowest -10.5 -5.5 -8.5 -2.4 -28 9.2 465 0.5
Next lowest -11.0 -4.7 -11.2 -6.2 -2 7.6 1077 0.4
Middle -10.9 -5.2 -10.6 -1.2 -19 7.6 889 0.5
Next highest -10.9 -4.7 -10.7 -0.6 12 7.3 1231 0.5
Highest -10.9 -6.5 -10.0 -2.1 -55 7.1 1305 0.3
Number of children below 18 years
No children -11.0 -5.2 -9.2 -1.7 12 7.8 944 0.4
One -10.9 -5.2 -10.8 -1.5 -48 7.2 1121 0.4
Two or more -10.8 -6.2 -10.6 -1.0 -47 7.1 1171 0.4
Region
Stockholm -10.7 -4.8 -8.7 -0.3 -147 8.4 579 0.2
Gothenburg/Malmö -10.9 -5.5 -9.6 -1.3 -50 7.8 972 0.4
Major towns -10.9 -6.6 -10.3 -1.3 -9 7.2 1100 0.4
Southern areas -10.9 -5.5 -10.6 -3.0 28 7.2 1189 0.5
Major towns n.a. -11.0 -3.5 -11.3 -3.9 59 7.3 1409 0.5
Northern areas -10.9 -4.6 -10.6 -2.1 76 7.0 1423 0.6
Notes: ∆Qi = percentage change in real consumption (quantity) on good i, ∆(T+VAT) = total change in tax
payment, ∆T% = percentage change in indirect tax payment. n.a. = northern areas.
The results in column 5 reveals that the total tax payment effects are small. The reason for
this is of course that the reform is revenue neutral, and that the tax replacement is in the form
of a cut in the general VAT.
The welfare effect, measured as compensation variation (CV), differs substantially be-
tween household categories.  According to column 7 in table 4, low-income households will
face a welfare loss amounting to SEK 465, whereas it is SEK 1,305 for the high-income
households. However, relative to disposable income the welfare loss will be greater for low-
income households indicating that the tax is regressive. The CV increases in absolute value
with the number of children, as expected, while it seems to be independent of the number of
children if we set the loss in relation to disposable income. Finally we observe that the welfare16
loss is largest for households in the northern part of Sweden, both in monetary terms and rela-
tive to disposable income.
In summary the results in table 4 reveals that the reform implies a cost for the Swedish
households. Thus it is apparent that the overall welfare change due to the reform depends on
the emission reduction and the value the households attribute to this reduction. In addition we
can conclude that distributional differences are most pronounced in the regional dimension.
Compared with Hansson-Brusewitz’s (1997) findings, the 11% reduction in petrol demand
in the household sector seems surprisingly high. Hansson-Brusewitz (1997) found that ex-
penses related to car ownership would decrease by only 1.7%. However, the result in this
study is not exactly comparable with that number, since we estimate the effect on petrol de-
mand, and not expenses related to car ownership.
11 In a survey by Goodwin (1992) it was
found that the average long-run elasticity for petrol is -0.84 for cross-section studies and -0.71
for time-series studies.
12 Thus, previous studies support the findings in this study to some ex-
tent.
Results C100PT
The second scenario is a revenue neutral tax reform in which the CO2 tax is doubled and
where the tax revenues are returned to the households in the form of a cut in the VAT for
public transport. The baseline VAT rate on public transport is 12% and the revenues from the
doubling of the CO2 tax are more than sufficient to cover a total removal of the VAT on pub-
lic transport. According to the results the increase in CO2 tax revenues suffices not only to
remove the VAT on public transport, but also allows an ad valorem subsidy of 23% on public
transport. As a result the reform gives rise to a 28% decrease in the effective consumer price
on public transport.
Table 5 reveals that the differences between different types of households are very small.
Petrol consumption will decrease by approximately 12%, irrespective of type of household.
According to the results the tax reform gives rise to a sharp increase in the demand for public
transport. On average the increase is about 43%. Demand for other transport will decrease by
approximately 5% on average. One conclusion then is that the tax reform will induce a strong
substitution from individual transports by car to public transport. The environmental effects
from the reform, in terms of CO2 emissions, cannot be determined without further assump-
                                                
11 Expenses related to car ownership are defined as purchase of petrol, repair expenses, park-
ing fees, garage costs, yearly vehicle control, etc.
12 In a study on Swedish data by Jansson & Wall (1994), the price elasticity for petrol was
estimated at -0.21 in the short run and -0.71 in the long run. Similar results can be found in
Franzén (1994).17
tions. Obviously there will be a positive effect due to the decrease in petrol consumption. On
the other hand the sharp increase in public transport may lead to an increase in emissions. The
effect on emissions due to the increase in public transports depends on the capital utilization
in the sector, as well as the “production function” for public transports. A low utilization rate
implies that more people can travel without increased emissions, whereas a high utilization
rate may lead to more emissions from the public transport sector. The net effect on emissions
is therefore ambiguous.













   ∆(T+VAT)
(SEK)
∆Τ% CV




Lowest -12.1 40.5 -5.3 -5.0 -166 12.6 416 0.5
Next lowest -11.8 40.1 -4.8 -4.0 50 8.9 1292 0.5
Middle -11.8 42.1 -6.2 -3.2 14 9.0 1064 0.5
Next highest -12.0 51.1 -5.5 -3.6 118 8.3 1514 0.6
Highest -11.7 31.7 -3.3 -3.7 1 8.5 1571 0.4
Number of children below 18 years
No children -11.7 43.9 -5.1 -3.9 -11 9.4 1061 0.5
One -11.8 54.4 -3.4 -3.4 -14 8.6 1340 0.5
Two or more -12.0 29.5 -5.4 -3.5 117 8.2 1519 0.5
Region
Stockholm -12.7 42.0 -4.9 -3.4 -713 13.2 191 0.1
Gothenburg/Malmö -11.7 45.6 -4.3 -4.4 -155 9.9 1037 0.4
Major towns -11.8 31.9 -4.8 -3.2 129 8.1 1396 0.6
Southern areas -11.5 49.2 -5.5 -4.3 372 7.4 1682 0.7
Major towns n.a. -11.6 50.3 -3.9 -4.0 246 8.0 1763 0.7
Northern areas -11.5 47.0 -6.1 -2.8 438 7.2 1941 0.8
Notes: ∆Qi = percentage change in real consumption (quantity) on good i, ∆(T+VAT) = total change in tax
payment, ∆T% = percentage change in indirect tax payment. n.a. = northern areas.
The tax payment effects on different households are presented in column 5. As expected,
households living in the most urbanised areas are overcompensated in the sense that they re-
ceive a net subsidy amounting to SEK 713 per year, whereas households in areas where public
transport is less developed get a net tax payment. In the most northern part of Sweden the tax
payment increases by SEK 438 per year. This corresponds to an increase in tax payment rela-
tive to disposable income of approximately 0.1%. The results also reveal that the tax burden is
smaller for low-income households than for high-income households. However, the distribu-
tion of the tax burden seems to be less sensitive between income groups than between differ-
ent regions, which is expected to some extent.  For households with many children the result
is a net tax payment while for households with no children or only one child there is only
small changes in their net tax payment.18
Although the low-income households and those living in the Stockholm area receive a
subsidy, the revenue-neutral reform implies a welfare loss in terms of CV for these house-
holds. Compared with the first scenario, the welfare loss relative to disposable income is dis-
tributed in a similar manner.
To conclude we have found that a tax reform where the CO2 tax revenues are used to sub-
sidise public transport does have rather strong distributional effects, especially in the regional
dimension. Households with many children living in areas where public transport is less de-
veloped cannot reap the benefits of the reform in the same way as households in the most ur-
ban areas can. Furthermore we can conclude that the environmental effect of such a reform, in
terms of CO2 emissions, is not clear-cut. The reason is that it can’t be ruled out that the sub-
sidy to public transport boost total travelling, hence counteracting the effect of reduced car
driving. From a social welfare point of view we can also conclude that a net subsidy on public
transport cannot be a first best alternative, unless it generate positive externalities.
6. Concluding remarks
One conclusion from the first scenario is that the CO2 tax has regional distribution effects, in
the sense that household living in sparsely populated areas carry a larger share of the tax bur-
den. This result is in line with other similar Swedish studies. Concerning the number of chil-
dren within the household and household income quintile, we found no significant differences
for the change in tax payments in relation to disposable income. Although the tax burden in
absolute value is larger for households with many children and high-income households.
However, in a simulation
13 where we do not return the revenues to the households, we found
no significant regional differences in tax payments in relation to income. The CO2 tax was
instead found to be regressive, in the sense that low-income households carried a larger share
of the tax burden.
The environmental effects, in terms of CO2 emissions, are unambiguous in the first sce-
nario since demand for all fossil fuel related goods is decreasing. Petrol demand will decrease
by approximately 11%, which means that the reduction in CO2 emissions from the Swedish
household sector will be slightly above 11%. This corresponds to an approximately 2% re-
duction in total emissions of CO2 in Sweden.
The distribution of the tax burden and the welfare loss is more uneven in the second sce-
nario where the tax revenue is returned in the form of a subsidy to public transport. The sec-
ond scenario implies that households in the most urbanised areas receive a net subsidy,
whereas those in less urbanised areas have to pay a net tax. A household in the Stockholm
area, for example, receives SEK 713 annually; while a similar household in the most sparsely
                                                
13 Due to space limitations this simulation is not shown.19
populated area in northern Sweden would have to pay SEK 438. The environmental effect is
less easy to derive in the second scenario. Although there is a sharp decrease in petrol de-
mand, this may to some extent be counteracted by a strong increase in the demand for public
transport. The net effect on the environment will depend on capacity utilization and the "pro-
duction function" for public transport.
A study like the present one suffers from a number of potential shortcomings, some
emerging from data limitations and some from assumptions that may be unreasonable. The
description of environmental effects due to tax changes belongs to the first group. For exam-
ple, environmental effects other than CO2 emissions may be important for peoples’ well be-
ing. Acidification, eutrophication, and effects on local air quality are examples of
environmental effects that are not considered, but which are very important. To cope with
these types of effects we would need a much more detailed "environmental module" that links
changes in consumption pattern to changes in emissions of sulphur, particulates, and so on,
and which in turn can be translated into actual environmental problems such as acidification
and effects on human health. At present, however, we cannot perform such an analysis due to
data limitations, but it is of course ranked high on the research agenda.
There are (at least) two assumptions that may be questioned. The first one is that we do not
model labour supply explicitly in the simulations, but use it as a conditioning good. This is the
correct approach if we believe that labour supply is "restricted", or fixed for the individual.
Thus, in the short run the approach taken may be relevant, as we obviously have labour supply
restrictions due to involuntary unemployment, but also due to more or less fixed working
hours for those who are employed. In the long run, however, this assumption is more dubious.
Related to this short-run versus long-run problem is the assumption in the scenarios that there
is no substitution between primary energy sources in residential heating. In the short run this
is probably an accurate description of reality, since a change of heating system is coupled with
large fixed costs for the household. In the long run, however, we can observe changes in
heating systems, which means that we may understate the total effect in fossil fuel consump-
tion due to CO2 tax changes. Finally, we have assumed that there are no "general equilibrium"
effects since the producer prices of all goods are assumed to be unaffected by the tax change.
The basic reason for this are the assumptions of Sweden as a small open economy and that
markets are competitive. However, many commodity markets may not fit this description, and
we can therefore not rule out the possibility of price effects.20
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Petrol share 0.029 0.041 0.049 0.052 0.051 0.059
(0.029) (0.037) (0.041) (0.039) (0.038) (0.042)
Public transport 0.018 0.010 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.005
share (0.023) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.020) (0.012)
Other transport 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.004
share (0.023) (0.021) (0.020) (0.017) (0.028) (0.018)
Energy share 0.035 0.041 0.051 0.055 0.061 0.064
(0.049) (0.047) (0.055) (0.058) (0.067) (0.065)
Other non-durable 0.910 0.902 0.887 0.883 0.873 0.868
Goods (0.066) (0.064) (0.073) (0.072) (0.079) (0.079)
Number of adults 1.74 1.77 1.79 1.83 1.82 1.84
(0.46) (0.47) (0.45) (0.41) (0.43) (0.44)
Children aged 0-2 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.14
(0.40) (0.40) (0.38) (0.41) (0.41) (0.38)
Children aged 3-6 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.26
(0.48) (0.50) (0.51) (0.54) (0.51) (0.54)
Children aged 7-17 0.59 0.62 0.64 0.68 0.67 0.68
(0.87) (0.91) (0.91) (0.94) (0.91) (0.94)
Children aged 18- 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.10
working (0.26) (0.30) (0.30) (0.31) (0.28) (0.35)
Children aged 18- 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.11
non working (0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.31) (0.32) (0.34)
Age of head 43.77 43.23 44.13 45.05 44.56 45.65
(13.49) (13.76) (13.81) (14.27) (14.00) (14.15)
Male hours 29.79 30.65 31.09 32.45 31.36 31.69
(19.03) (18.84) (18.49) (18.17) (18.19) (18.71)
Female hours 26.86 24.14 24.05 22.93 24.39 22.56
(16.58) (16.79) (16.55) (16.73) (16.50) (17.20)
Total expenditures 172 300 166 700 154 300 148 300 152 200 147 000
Sample size 1 988 1 586 4 029 2 610 933 776
Notes: Standard deviations within parentheses. Source: The Family Expenditure Survey 1985, 1988 and 1992.24










Intercept of the expenditure equations
Constant -.689 -.89 .101 2.10 -2.089 -2.19 -.050 -.07 3.251 3.79
Stockholm .050 .12 .020 .78 .559 .74 .314 .55 -.530 -.94
GB/Malmö .800 1.93 -.016 -.61 -.456 -.60 .877 1.59 -1.345 -2.32
Major towns .434 1.18 -.013 -.50 -.068 -.09 .767 1.50 -1.210 -2.25
Southern
areas
1.030 1.63 -.010 -.38 -.390 -.48 1.938 2.99 -2.361 -3.36
Major towns
n.a.
.520 .95 .033 1.06 -1.872 -1.91 .958 1.59 -.088 -.12
Ch 0-2 -.248 -.90 -.007 -.56 1.303 .94 .231 .70 .327 .90
Ch 3-6 -.061 -.26 -.008 -.77 -.282 -.68 -.811 -2.50 .606 1.73
Ch 7-17 -.185 -1.58 -.007 -1.34 .200 .66 -.000 -.00 .538 2.23
Ch 18- w -.808 -1.69 -.002 -.10 .201 .36 -.005 -.010 1.493 2.31
Ch 18-nw -.220 -.72 .020 1.42 .869 2.70 -.342 -1.08 .215 .50
Adult .183 .56 .014 1.33 .096 .25 .747 2.59 -.549 -1.28
Years old -.001 -.17 -.001 -1.81 -.003 -.31
Male hours .020 2.56 -.001 -.78 -.003 -.28 -.021 -2.69 -.017 -1.56
Female
hours
-.014 -2.81 .001 1.08 -.002 -.38 -.004 -.62 .003 .33
d2 .001 .26 .000 .23 .006 2.15 .001 .40 -.000 -.03
d3 -.0001 -.29 .000 .36 -.008 -2.36 -.002 -.60 .005 1.39
d4 -.003 -1.72 .002 1.48 -.003 -1.13 .000 .14 .006 2.20
Trend -.000 -.38 .000 .29 .000 .86 .000 .66 -.001 -1.29
Mills 1467 1.93 351 1.39 3586 4.57 -4005 -2.64
Linear expenditure coefficients
Constant .225 1.11 -.012 -1.94 .515 2.05 .042 .21 -.598 -2.58
Stockholm -.027 -.25 -.001 -.45 -.132 -.66 -.115 -.77 .173 1.17
GB/Malmö -.215 -1.97 .002 .70 .131 .65 -.264 -1.80 .384 2.50
Major towns -.122 -1.26 .002 .52 .031 .16 -.220 -1.62 .330 2.32
Southern
areas
-.277 -1.63 .001 .32 .113 .53 -.530 -3.06 .639 3.38
Major towns
n.a.
-.140 -.95 -.004 -1.02 .512 1.97 -.261 -1.63 .021 .11
Ch 0-2 .065 .91 .001 .37 -.359 -.98 -.059 -.68 -.091 -.96
Ch 3-6 .019 .31 .001 .65 .069 .64 .212 2.51 -.165 -1.81
Ch 7-17 .049 1.63 .001 1.40 -.060 -.77 .003 .052 -.140 -2.25
Ch 18- w .221 1.80 .000 .23 -.053 -.37 .006 .052 -.389 -2.35
Ch 18-nw .058 .76 -.002 -1.13 -.227 -2.83 .087 1.08 -.047 -.43
Adult -.041 -.47 -.002 -1.38 -.027 -.27 -.173 -2.29 .126 1.11
Years old .000 .00 .000 1.79 .000 .14
Male hours -.005 -2.50 .000 .63 .001 .28 .006 2.69 .004 1.33
Female
hours
.004 2.77 -.000 -.96 .001 .38 .001 .53 -.001 -.42
Notes: t-values computed from heteroscedastic-consistent matrix (Robust-White). GB = Gothenburg, n.a. =
northern areas, Ch = children, w = working, nw = non working. In the regression northern areas has been
used as reference region.25











Constant -.017 -1.26 -.031 -1.88 -.004 -.30 .039 2.47
Stockholm .002 .34 .008 .59 .009 .95 -.013 -1.35
GB/Malmö .014 1.98 -.009 -.70 .019 1.98 -.027 -2.65
Major towns .008 1.31 -.003 -.22 .015 1.71 -.022 -2.35
Southern
areas
.018 1.62 -.008 -.57 .036 3.10 -.043 -3.38
Major towns
n.a.
.009 .95 -.035 -2.01 .018 1.67 -.001 -.09
Ch 0-2 -.004 -.93 .025 1.02 .004 .67 .006 1.02
Ch 3-6 -.001 -.36 -.004 -.60 -.014 -2.51 .011 1.88
Ch 7-17 -.003 -1.66 .004 .88 -.000 -.08 .009 2.24
Ch 18- w -.015 -1.90 .003 .37 -.001 -.08 .025 2.36
Ch 18-nw -.003 -.78 .015 2.98 -.005 -1.06 .002 .33
Adult .002 .41 .002 .28 .010 2.02 -.007 -.96
Years old .000 .14 -.000 -.03
Male hours .0003 2.44 -.000 -.28 -.0004 -2.68 -.0002 -1.15
Female
hours
-.0002 -2.71 -.000 -.40 -.0001 -.44 .0001 .50
Price coefficients
Petrol .010 .72 .003 .31 -.020 -.85 .332 12.38 -.231 -8.67
Public tran. .017 .90 .012 1.00 -.075 -2.29 -.027 -.76 -.005 -.13
Other tran. .025 2.03 -.009 -1.11 .040 1.17 .056 3.21 -.089 -4.20
Heating .002 .23 -.003 -.69 .012 1.08 -.159 -14.05 .146 10.28
Notes: t-values computed from heteroscedastic-consistent matrix (Robust-White). GB = Gothenburg, n.a. =
northern areas, Ch = children, w = working, nw = non working. In the regression northern areas has been
used as reference region.








































































Not: t-values within parentheses.26









Petrol 4 10 6 . 8
− × −
(-0.03)
3 10 9 . 4
− ×
(0.84)
2 10 5 . 1
− ×
(1.93)
2 10 5 . 1
− × −
(-0.75)
Public transport 3 10 8 . 4
− × −
(-2.34)
2 10 5 . 1
− × −
(-3.48)
3 10 2 . 8
− ×
(1.26)
Other transport 2 10 2 . 5
− × −
(-3.31)
2 10 9 . 3
− ×
(3.74)
Heating 1 10 3 . 1
− × −
(-3.92)
Not: t-values within parentheses.

















































































Not: t-values within parentheses.